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SECRETS REVEALED: THE LIMITS OF
MEDICAL CONFIDENCE
Professsor Louis Waller, A *
I.
On Monday 8th December 1987, within less than one quarter of an hour
in that dull, somewhat humid afternoon, nine people-5 women and 4
men-died awful, violent deaths, in the very heart of the Central Business
District in the city of Melbourne, Australia's second largest metropolis.
Eight of them were shot at point-blank range by the ninth victim, a 23-year-
old man named Frank Vitkovic. Breaking free from the restraining hands of
several heroic colleagues of his dead victims, Vitkovic plunged to his own
death through a window already shattered by one of the many shots he had
fired.
The State Coroner conducted an investigation and held an inquest into
those nine deaths, which quickly became known as the Queen Street massa-
cre.' Vitkovic, he found, was a keen sportsman 2 who had done so well in his
secondary schooling that he was admitted to the Faculty of Law in the Uni-
versity of Melbourne, where in 1984 he completed the first year courses.
That year a knee injury had affected his tennis; this worsened and in 1985, he
also became quite depressed.3 In 1986, he re-commenced his interrupted
studies in law and successfully underwent knee surgery. To a friend, he
showed continuing signs of depression; he talked of suicide. In his law of
contract examination paper, written in November 1986, Vitkovic wrote, in
the words of the Coroner, "a bizarre and inappropriate essay about crime,
death, capital punishment and a violent and chaotic society". 4 After that
answer had been read, Vitkovic was advised by teachers and administrators
* LL.B. (Hons) (Melb.); B.C.L. (Oxf.); FA.S.SA. Sir Leo Cussen Chair of Law, Monash
University Chairman, Standing Review and Advisory Committee on Infertility, Victoria, Aus-
tralia. This is a revised version of the Public Lecture delivered in the University of Edin-
burgh, where I was the first Australian National Fellow in the Institute of Advanced Studies
in the Humanities, on November 6, 1990.
1. See generally Victoria. State Coroner's Office. Record of Investigation and Inquisition
into the Deaths of Frank Vitkovic and Others. (Coroner's Office, October 7, 1988) (discussing
the deaths of Frank Vitkovic and his eight victims) [hereinafter State Coroner's Report].
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id. at 11.
4. See generally id. at 12 (discussing the "bizarre essay").
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in the Melbourne Law School to seek help. He consulted a qualified psy-
chologist employed in the University Counselling Service. The psychologist
considered his client to.be "severely disturbed"; suffering deep psychological
and prepsychotic problems; indicating violence to his friends and himself
(though this, the psychologist considered was fantasy and not a real intent);
speaking of suicide; and "in need of psychiatric assessment" and "most
likely requiring medication and hospitalization". 5 Vitkovic completely re-
jected the psychologist's suggestion that he should see a psychiatrist; he did
not keep his next counselling appointment. Many questions spring from or
are stimulated by the statements in a report that eventually goes on to de-
scribe in precise details what occurred just a year after Vitkovic visited the
counseling session. Vitkovic, according to ex post facto psychiatric assess-
ments provided for the State Coroner, was a paranoid psychotic, probably
schizophrenic, totally out of touch with reality and insane.6 Should the psy-
chologist have spoken about his assessment? To whom? Was he under an
obligation to utter a warning?
There are other, less awful but still disturbing situations that give rise to
the same sorts of questions. What should the endocrinologist, whose se-
verely diabetic patient bluntly refuses to relinquish his job as a dogman-rig-
ger, riding huge steel girders as they swing in the air above busy city
thoroughfares, say or write to his employer, or to the police? Is the right
answer "Nothing at all"? Thirty years ago the present Vice-Chancellor of
the University of Melbourne, a distinguished haematologist, told the
Medico-Legal Society of Victoria, in opening the discussion on a paper on
professional secrecy, that "the late W.R. Boyd [a well-known Melbourne
doctor] had told him that he would never fail to communicate to one spouse
that the other was suffering from venereal disease."7 Today, doctors in pri-
vate and public practice, here and everywhere, must wonder, and often be
wracked by uncertainty, when they have before them reports that their pa-
tients have been diagnosed as infected with the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV), which will lead to that now so well-known but dreaded acro-
nym, AIDS. Should the patient's spouse, or longtime or short-term partner,
be told that, by the doctor? Or is it the patient's secret, to be revealed, or
not, by her or by him only? A few years ago, an Australian doctor partici-
pating in a TV "hypothetical" on AIDS screened by the Australian Broad-
casting Corporation said-hypothetically-that he would not tell a spouse
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2.
7. Discussion with Dr. J. Pennington following paper given by K.A. Aickin, Professional
Secrecy as an Enforceable Obligation, IX THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEDICO-LEGAL SOCI-
ETY OF VICTORIA 1, 17 (1960-63) [hereinafter Pennington].
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that her or his partner was suffering from AIDS-but would tell a fellow
doctor who was treating the person.
I shall consider two separate but related questions arising out of these
instances. My perspective is a lawyer's, but, as ever, there is both interplay
and close-knit interaction between ethics and legal principles, standards and
rules. Although my central concern is with the relationship of doctor and
patient, it is patent that relationships arising in the practice of many allied
health professions, such as that of clinical psychology in the Vitkovic epi-
sode, or in the realms of the speech or the occupational or the physical thera-
pies, or in the profession of nursing, may come with the same questions, as
urgent and as difficult as in the practice of medicine.
My first enquiry is this. If the doctor-patient relationship is one of confi-
dence, when, if ever, may the doctor or health professional tell her or his
patient's secrets? Could the psychologist, ethically and lawfully, have told
the University authorities, or the police, of his assessment of Vitkovic? My
second enquiry is, when, if ever, must the doctor or health professional re-
veal a patient's confidences? Can the dependents of the victims obtain legal
redress because the psychologist was silent? Secrets and confidences, in this
context, include not only what is conveyed by the patient but also what is
discovered or learned by the doctor, however, that occurs. The fourth of
King Charles I's "twelve good rules" is plain: "Reveal no secrets."' But it is
the Hippocratic oath attributed to the Greek priest-physician who lived 2400
years ago that serves still to enunciate a fundamental medical ethic. "What-
soever in the course of practice I see or hear (or outside my practice in social
intercourse) that ought not to be published abroad, I will not divulge but will
consider such things as to be holy secrets." 9
II
The physician's ethical duty had been incorporated in current statements
and guidelines adopted and published by medical and other professional as-
sociations. It is, for instance, in the "Advice on Standards of Professional
Conduct and on Medical Ethics" published by the General Medical Coun-
cil.1 0 A breach may result not just in professional censure, but in exclusion
from practice, for a time or indefinitely, in the context of that disciplinary
framework that the law has fashioned for medicine, and as they have
achieved recognition as professions, for the allied health therapies as well.
8. See OLIVER GOLDSMITH, THE DESERTED VILLAGE in POEMS, PLAYS AND ESSAYS
86 (1960); see also Pennington, supra note 7, at 2 (quoting the Hippocratic Oath).
9. Pennington, supra note 7, at 2.
10. GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, ADVICE ON STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT AND ON MEDICAL ETHICS.
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The real force of the medical ethic was recently made apparent in a New
Zealand case." Dr. Ian Duncan practiced in a small town in the North Is-
land. One of his patients was the owner-driver of a bus, who had operated it
for 30 years. In 1982, the driver had several heart attacks, culminating in a
cardiac arrest. Dr. Duncan attended the driver as his general practitioner;
he was admitted to hospital where a specialist surgeon performed a triple
coronary artery by-pass operation. The surgeon subsequently examined his
patient and, at his request, gave him a certificate that enabled him again to
obtain a bus-driver's licence.
When Dr. Duncan learned that his patient intended to drive his bus on a
charter trip to Auckland, he told him he had no licence, or medical clear-
ance, and could not drive. The driver corrected him. Dr. Duncan then
asked the local police constable to revoke the driver's licence; the local pol-
icy told Dr. Duncan that was impossible. Before speaking to his patient, Dr.
Duncan had spoken to one of the charter passengers: He told her that the
driver was not fit to drive and could have a heart attack at any time. After
the trip had been uneventfully completed, the patient discovered that a
friend of his had been asked by Dr. Duncan to help organise a petition to
have him barred from driving buses. Unsurprisingly, he complained to the
Medical Practioners Disciplinary Committee, which found Dr. Duncan
"guilty of professional misconduct in that he breached professional confi-
dence in informing lay people of his patient's personal medical history." 2
Dr. Duncan then heaped Pelion upon Ossa. He wrote to metropolitan
newspapers and gave television interviews "ventilating his opinion about the
complainant's [his patient's] health and acceptability as a public driver and
complaining that the Disciplinary Committee had not given a fair hear-
ing."'13 This resulted in a further complaint by the patient, whose medical
history was now embodied in what he described as "an outburst to the whole
nation." Ultimately, the Medical Council of New Zealand found Dr.
Duncan "guilty of professional misconduct by disclosing confidential infor-
mation to the national news media in breach of his professional responsibili-
ties in respect of [the patient's] medical history."' 4 Dr. Duncan's media
foray had unleashed other, unrelated complaints of professional misconduct,
also found proven. The Medical Council ordered that his name be removed
from the medical register, and that he might not apply for registration for 12
11. Duncan v. Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, 1 N.Z.L.R. 513 (1986)
(Austl.).
12. Id. at 518.
13. Id. at 540.
14. Id. at 550.
Limits of Medical Confidence
months. I shall return to Dr. Duncan, who sought judicial review of these
disciplinary decisions in the High Court of New Zealand.
There is no doubt today that the long-recognized ethical duty has its legal
counterpart. A doctor may be restrained at the suit of a patient from re-
vealing information discovered in the professional relationship. A doctor
may be mulcted in damages because confidential information has been re-
vealed. This is how Justice Bingham put it in the now much-publicized Eng-
lish case of W. v. Egdell in 1989:
He could not lawfully sell the contents of his report to a newspaper
.... Nor could he, without breach of the law as well as profes-
sional etiquette, discuss the case in a learned article or in his
memoirs or in gossiping with friends, unless he took appropriate
steps to conceal the identity of W.15
Nearly 150 years ago, Lord Ivory, sitting as one of the judges in the First
Division of the Court of Session, had stated this, robustly and simply, in his
judgement in a case where pursuer and defender - a doctor - were both
accorded alphabetical alibis:
It would be a most serious thing to admit the argument of the de-
fender, that there is no confidentiality between a medical man and
his employer .... If it could ever have been doubted that such a
confidential relationship subsists between a medical man and his
employer, I think it is high time that such a doubt should now be
set at rest for ever.16
Today the assumption of a contract of service with an implied term of confi-
dentiality upon which Lord Ivory's statement depends need not be made. In
modern judgments, in many common law jurisdictions, it is the existence of
a doctor-patient relationship that is the foundation of the duty to keep a
patient's secrets. "It is beyond doubt," said Justice Kelly in the Supreme
Court of the Australian Capital Territory in November 1986, "that a duty of
confidentiality lies between a doctor and his patient.'7 The doctor in ques-
tion was an employee of the ACT Health Authority, whose duties were to
see anyone who came to a city clinic. The fiduciary quality of the doctor-
patient relation is the foundation of the duty, said Justice Jeffries in Duncan.
More attention is paid today to the reason why there is a legal duty to
guard those secrets. In Victoria, where that legal duty is further armored in
that a doctor must claim privilege' 8 against answering questions, in pretrial
15. W. v. Egdel, I Ch. 359, 419 (C.A. 1990).
16. A.B. v. C.D., 14 D. 177, 180 (1851).
17. Slater v. Bassett, 69 A.C.L.R. 25, 28 (1986)(Austi.).
18. VICT. EVIDENCE ACT § 28(2) (1958).
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interrogatories or in court, about a patient's communications, in the course
of most civil proceedings, Justice Sholl said:
... I think the great preponderance of judicial opinion is to the
effect that the policy of the legislation [i.e. the privilege provision in
the Victorian Evidence Act 1958] is to protect the patient from the
fear of disclosure. The fear seems to have been that persons suffer-
ing from illness or disease might be restrained by fear of the ulti-
mate disclosure of their confidences from seeking medical attention
in due time, or at all. True it is, that there has been, as a matter of
historical fact, pressure upon public opinion by the medical profes-
sion in favor of some statutory protection of communications made
to its members, but, in my view, the general purpose of the legisla-
tion is the protection of the patient's interests, and not the protec-
tion of the medical man's interests as such. 9
At much the same time a United States judge said:
Since the layman is unfamiliar with the road to recovery, he cannot
sift the circumstances of his life and habits to determine what is
information pertinent to his health. As a consequence, he must
disclose all information in his consultations with his doctor - even
that which is embarrassing, disgraceful or incriminating. To pro-
mote full disclosure, the medical profession extends the promise of
secrecy.20
To those specific reasons or explanations there may now be added that
clearly recognized interest in the protection of personal privacy, including
particularly, every kind of information about an individual's health and hab-
its of life. In Australia, the never quiescent debate engendered among com-
mon lawyers by Warren and Brandeis's seminal article of 1890 on privacy
2
and its legal protection has been overtaken by, first, the publication in 1983
of the Australian Law Reform Commission's Reports on Privacy, 22 which
were to some degree heralded by the pioneering work and reports of the
New South Wales Privacy Committee, and then by the enactment by the
Commonwealth Parliament of the Privacy Act of 1988. That legislation
states in its preamble its connection to international conventions enunciating
and seeking to protect the right of personal privacy. The Act specifically
extends the common law, by building on the established action for breach of
confidence, in which a federal agency or officer, or any person within the
Australian Capital Territory, is subject to an obligation of confidence.23 The
19. Pacyna v. Grimam, V.S.Ct. 421, 428 (V.S.Ct. 1963).
20. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp 793, 801 (E.D. Ohio 1965).
21. S.D. Warren & L.D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy. 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (10890).
22. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION PRIVACY § 164.9 (Vols. I & 2 1983).
23. AUSTL. PRIVACY ACT § 89 (1988).
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general language of the legislation clearly encompasses personal information
and communications2 4 passed in or arising out of any kind of medical re-
search,25 in federal contexts.
The Privacy Act of 1988 also deals specifically with personal information
and medical research. It empowers the National Health and Medical Re-
search Council to issue guidelines "for the protection of privacy in the con-
duct of medical research."26 The guidelines may only be promulgated if
they are approved by the Privacy Commissioner,27 appointed under the Act
to oversee the implementation of the provisions. The Commissioner may
only approve them if "satisfied that the public interest in the promotion of
research of the kind to which the guidelines relate outweighs to a substantial
degree the public interest in maintaining adherence to the Information Pri-
vacy Principles" 28 set out in the Act. Chief among these are that personal
information may only be collected from people clearly informed about the
reasons why collection is undertaken; in a manner not too intrusive; with
protections against its misuse and unauthorized disclosure; and with its use
restricted to the collecting agency, unless the person concerned permits
wider disclosure.
The NH & MRC has published interim guidelines for the Protection of
Privacy in Medical Research, originally in force until December 31, 1990
which has since been extended. The central element in them is that Institu-
tional Ethics Committees in universities, research institutes, and hospitals,
which determine whether any research project involving human subjects or
human tissue may be undertaken, must now determine whether each project
is concerned with research where the public interest in it outweighs to a
substantial degree the public interest in privacy. The chief impact of the
guidelines will be in relation to epidemiological research, where it may be
regarded as necessary to collect very large amounts of information about
very substantial groups or constituencies in the population. In its state-
ment29 accompanying the guidelines, the NH & MRC has emphasized the
value of large scale epidemiological research, in the improvement of Austra-
lian public health. Its chief examples are on cigarette smoking in the 1950s,
oral contraceptive pills, long-term effects of ionizing radiation, and chemical
24. Id. §§ 14, 96.
25. Id. § 95.
26. Id. § 95(l).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 95(2).
29. See NATIONAL HEALTH & MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL NEWS RELEASE, Febru-
ary 26, 1990 (incorporating "The Public Interest in Medical Research" and parts of the Na-
tional Health & Medical Research Council Report on Ethics in Epidemiological Research
1980).
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exposures and war service. Ex post facto, the NH & MRC believes that the
public interest in properly conducted medical research in those instances,
which "advances the Community's understanding of disease and improves
its capacity to prevent or heal disease,"'30 satisfied the criterion in the guide-
lines. What is significant is that personal privacy is paramount. As Justice
Jeffries said in Dr. Duncan's case, in the High Court of New Zealand,
Overall, confidentiality has recently become more prominent as an
issue. Society's response has been articulate in that it seeks to
break down unnecessary official secrecy but to strengthen protec-
tion of personal confidences and secrets. 3'
The juxtaposition of the Australian Privacy Act of 1988 and the conse-
quences it has had, and the overall thrust and tone of the few recent cases
mentioned, with the statements on public interest immunity, or Crown privi-
lege as it was once called, in recent major judgments 32 of the High Court of
Australia, and the whole saga of the Spycatcher3 3 litigation, especially in the
courts of New South Wales, justifies that statement by Justice Jeffries.
Although flood-lights may now shine legitimately upon the arcana imperil
and even the records of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
may be scrutinized by the High Court to see whether they may be discovered
in litigation, private secrets-especially medical secrets-must be sedulously
preserved from any revelation. Are there any exceptions? When may medi-
cal secrets be revealed?
III
One of the issues argued in the New Zealand case of Duncan v. Medical
Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, was that the Committee's "view of
medical confidence was generally too narrow and inflexible."' 34 Dr Duncan,
it will be recalled, believed that his patient's cardiac condition made it dan-
gerous for him to drive a charter bus. According to Justice Jeffries,
There may be occasons, they are fortunately rare, when a doctor
receives information involving a patient that another's life is imme-
30. Id.
31. Duncan v. Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, 1 N.Z.L.R. 513, 520
(1986)(Austl.).
32. Sankey v. Whitlam, 142 C.L.R. 1 (1942)(Austi.); Alister v. R., 154 C.L.R. 404
(1984)(Austl.).
33. Attorney General v. Heinemann Publishers Australia, 8 N.S.W.L.R. 341 (1987)
(Powell, J., opinion), on appeal to 10 N.S.W.L.R. 86 (1987), appealed to 75 A.L.R. 461(Austl.
1987) (opinion by J. Deane), appealed to 165 C.L.R. 30 (Austl. 1988); Attorney General v.
Heinemann Publishers Australia II, 165 C.L.R. 30 (Full Court 1988).
34. Duncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, 1 N.Z.L.R. 513, 520 (1986)
(Austl.).
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diately endangered and urgent action is required. The doctor must
then exercise his professional judgment based upon the circum-
stances, and if he fairly and reasonably believes such a danger ex-
ists then he must act unhesitatingly to prevent injury or loss of life
even if there is to be a breach of confidentiality.35
For Justice Jeffries there is a "clear and present danger to life or limb" ex-
ception-"fortunately rare." That kind of exception or limitation on medical
confidence has been explored very recently in two cases in the English Court
of Appeal.
In 1974, W shot and killed five people and wounded two others, in an
episode during which he also hurled a number of hand-made bombs from his
car. He was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, involving
delusions of persecution by neighbours. The Crown accepted W's plea of
guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility; after
conviction he was detained in a number of special hospitals on the authority
of orders made under the United Kingdom Mental Health Act 1959.36 In
the course of the review process conducted by a mental health review tribu-
nal, which began in 1984, W's solicitors instructed Dr. Henry Egdell, "a
distinguished consultant psychiatrist," and himself a member of a mental
health review tribunal, to prepare a report on W, for use in the review pro-
cess, with a view to securing W's transfer to a regional secure unit, and ulti-
mately his release. Dr. Egdell formed the view that W was still dangerous,
and should not be transferred to less secure conditions, much less dis-
charged. His opinion was in striking contrast to those formed by W's re-
sponsible medical officer, and by a consultant psychiatrist in the regional
secure unit. Upon receipt of Dr. Egdell's report, W's solicitors withdrew his
application for transfer.
Dr. Egdell wanted his report to be considered by both the tribunal con-
ducting a routine review of W's case, and by the Home Office, the depart-
ment ultimately responsible for W's disposition. W refused to agree to the
disclosure of Dr Edgell's report to the medical officer at the hospital in
which he was detained. After he made further unsuccessful requests Dr.
Egdell sent a copy to that officer, and copies subsequently reached the Home
Office. W's solicitors took proceedings to restrain Dr. Edgell from revealing
the report and requiring the delivery up of all copies of it. W was, they
contended, Dr. Egdell's patient; his statements to the psychiatrist and Dr.
Egdell's evaluations and conclusions were secrets not to be revealed without
W's express or at least tacit consent. The trial judge, Justice Scott, dismissed
35. Id. at 521.
36. Mental Health Act §§ 60, 65 (1958) repealed by Mental Health Act § 148(3) (1983).
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W's action. He held that though there was a duty of confidence owed by Dr.
Egdell to W, it was overridden or outweighed by the public interest in the
protection of members of the community secured by the communication of
the report. In his judgment, Justice Scott contrasted what he labelled as W's
"private interest" in preserving the confidentiality of the report with "the
weight of the public interest". He also characterized W as a special kind of
patient;
W was not an ordinary member of the public .... W's own inter-
ests would not be the only nor the main criterion in the taking of
those decisions [decisions about transfer or discharge]. The safety
of the public would be the main criterion. In my view, a doctor
called upon, as Dr. Egdell was, to examine a patient such as W
owes a duty not only to his patient but also a duty to the public.37
In parenthesis, it is easy to imagine Dr. Duncan saying, "What about me?"
There are some disquieting elements in the judgment of Justice Scott. His
characterization of W as a special kind of patient, because he was held in
highly secure custody, suggests that for that judge there is a different kind of
duty of confidentiality than that owed to a patient then and there considered
by her or his psychiatrist to be highly dangerous, like, perhaps, Frank
Vitkovic in December 1986.
The Court of Appeal dismissed W's appeal. But neither the presiding
judge, Sir Stephen Brown, President of the Family Division, nor Justice
Bingham (with whose judgments the third judge, Sir John May, simply
agreed) adopted Justice Scott's approach. Both emphasized that there is an
important public interest, which is expressed in a legal duty, in the preserva-
tion of medical confidences. Justice Bingham explicitly rejected any restric-
tions on the duty of confidence flowing from W's situation as a security
patient seeking a review of his position. Those circumstances did not, he
concluded,
"deprive W of his ordinary right to confidence underpinned, as
such rights are, by the public interest. A restricted patient who
believes himself unnecessarily confined has, of all members of soci-
ety, perhaps the greatest need for a professional adviser who is
truly independent and reliably discreet .... [R]estricted patients
should not enjoy rights of confidence less valuable than those en-
joyed by other patients . ... .
This is a principled, attractive conclusion in this context.
Both judges, however, recognized that there is another public interest that
was to be weighed in a balance the other pan of which held the public inter-
37. W. v. Egdell, 1 Ch. 359, 392 (1990).
38. Id. at 420, 423.
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est in the preservation of medical secrets. Its expression is in the language of
the public's safety and security, and the personal safety and security of every
other member of the community. It is, perhaps, as general as Cicero's decla-
ration Salus populi suprema est lex. Other duties of confidence in other sig-
nificant relationships might also be limited, or overborne, by the public
interest in public safety. The language used in the General Medical Coun-
cil's "Blue Book," to guide doctors in practice, was mentioned with ap-
proval. In the instant case, the Court understandably looked at the "index
offence." W had killed a number of people in frightening circumstances.
"The authorities responsible for W's treatment and management must be
entitled to the fullest relevant information concerning his condition. It is
clear that Dr. Egdell did have highly relevant information about W's condi-
tion which reflected upon his dangerousness,, 39 said the President. Justice
Bingham concluded that
Where a man has committed multiple killings under the disability'
of serious mental illness, decisions which may lead directly or indi-
rectly to his release from hospital should not be made unless a re-
sponsible authority is properly able to make an informed judgment
that the risk of repetition is so small as to be acceptable. A con-
sultant psychiatrist who becomes aware, even in the course of a
confidential relationship, of information which leads him, in the
exercise of what the court considers a sound professional judg-
ment, to fear that such decisions may be made on the basis of inad-
equate information and with a real risk of consequent danger to the
public is entitled to take such steps as are reasonable in all the
circumstances to communicate the grounds of his concern to the
responsible authorities. 4'
One public interest outweighed another, and the secret was lawfully dis-
closed. Earlier this year, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) adopted
the same approach in the case of Regina v Crozier.4
The defendant had pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of his sister,
whom he had attacked with an axe. The background was a family trust
dispute. A psychiatrist, Dr. Wright, who examined the defendant in prison
formed the view that he was sane. The trial judge postponed sentencing
until a medical report was provided. A second psychiatrist, Dr. McDonald,
instructed by Mr. Crazier then examined him; he prepared a report that the
defendant was suffering from a mental illness of a psychopathic nature, was
a danger to his family, and ought to be detained in a maximum security
39. Id. at 416.
40. Id. at 424.
41. R. v. Crozier, 12 Cr. App. R. 206 (Crim. App. 1990).
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facility for an indefinite period. This report was not given to Mr. Crazier's
counsel; he told the trial judge there was no medical evidence to be led on
sentence. The judge proceeded to sentence the appellant to nine years impris-
onment. As sentence was being pronounced the psychiatrist entered the
court-room, expecting to testify. He then showed his report to counsel for
the Crown. The Crown's application for a variation of sentence resulted
subsequently in the quashing of the sentence of imprisonment and the substi-
tution of a hospital order coupled with a restriction order. The defendant
appealed on the grounds that his psychiatrist had given the Crown the report
in breach of his duty of confidentiality, and thus denied him the choice of
deciding whether medical evidence would be provided to the Court. His
appeal against sentence was dismissed.
Justice Watkins stated that:
[A]t first blush it seemed entirely wrong that Dr. McDonald [the
psychiatrist] should take the action he did.... [H]e felt impelled to
ensure that the court became aware of it [the opinion] .... [T]his
too is a case where there was strong public interest in disclosure of
[the psychiatrist's] views than in the confidence he owed to the
appellant.42
The psychiatrist showed his report to the Crown before the appellant knew
its contents.43 The Court considered that even if, as in the Egdell case, Mr.
Crazier had instructed the psychiatrist and his own advocate to conceal it,
"Dr McDonald [the psychiatrist] would have seen it as his duty to take the
action which he did."'  Again, the safety of others, apparently identified
others, was held to outweigh the public interest in preserving a patient's con-
fidences, and what was learned in that relationship.
Crozier s41 is even more emphatic an expression of the limits of medical
confidence than is W. v. Egdell.46 Here the appellant's doctor revealed his
report to the Crown, the overt adversary in the forensic contest which the
common law still contends is conducted between protagonists on even terms.
Unlike Dr. Egdell, Dr. McDonald did not ask his patient to allow him to
reveal the report. Since the sentence of imprisonment was already pro-
nounced, special procedures to set it aside had to be invoked. Time for dis-
cussion was available. But none of this seems to have affected the Court of
Appeal.
These cases make it clear that, in England today, there is both a duty to
42. Id. at 211-213.
43. Id. at 213.
44. Id.
45. 12 Cr. App. R. 206 (Crim. App. 1990)
46. 1 Ch. 359 (1990).
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preserve medical secrets, and limitations upon or exceptions to that duty
brought under a general rubric of "countervailing public interest." It is a
piece of judicial law making much in line with what has been done by courts,
including the High Court of Australia, the final court of appeal in the coun-
try, in relation to that most favoured of confidential relationships, that of
lawyer and client. There the client's secrets must not only be preserved by
the lawyer; the common law will not allow them to be discovered in or out of
court in legal proceedings, unless the client consents. Recently, the High
Court of Australia4 7 has held that lawyer-client privilege protects confi-
dences outside the courtroom, so that a lawyer could lawfully refuse to allow
police officers or taxation investigators, though armed with warrants, to read
the papers or run the tapes. Lawyer-client privilege has long been subject to
an exception where the client is using, or seeking to use, the services of the
lawyer to perpetrate crime or fraud. In 1980, the High Court decided that a
solicitor acting for a client who had expressly requested that her address be
kept secret was bound to reveal it in the course of Family Court proceedings
focussing on the custody of the client's child, with whom she had absconded.
Justice Gibbs, later Chief Justice of Australia, said that
[T]he public interest in securing the welfare of the child, and 'in
ensuring that an order made for securing that welfare is not delib-
erately flouted, prevails over the competing public interest that
confidential communications between solicitor and client should be
protected from disclosure in order that members of the public may
be free to seek that legal advice without which justice cannot prop-
erly be administered.4"
In the notorious Spycatcher case, in the final English episode in that al-
most universal litigious whirligig, Lord Goff of Chieveley stated, in terms of
broad generality, that:
[A]lthough the basis of the law's protection of confidence is that
there is a public interest that confidences should be preserved and
protected by the law, nevertheless that public interest may be out-
weighed by some other countervailing public interest which
favours disclosure.4 9
IV
The balancing process does not always result in justified revelation. Not
long before Dr. Egdell's case was tried, Justice Rose heard an application by
an English area health authority seeking an injunction to restrain a national
47. Baker v Campbell, 153 C.L.R. 52 (1983) (Austl.).
48. R. v. Bell, 146 C.L.R. 141, 146-7 (1980) (Austl.).
49. Attorney General v. Guardian Newspaper Ltd, II 1 C.A. 109, 282 (1990).
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newspaper from publishing a detailed report that two doctors were being
treated for AIDS in one of its hospitals. The newspaper contended that pub-
lication was justified, despite a clear breach of medical confidence, because it
was in the public interest. Alphabetical anonymity once again conceals all
participants; the case is X v. Y.o The judge recognized "the very important
public interest in freedom of the press." 51 He recognized "some public inter-
est in knowing that which the defendants seek to publish .... ,52 But he
concluded that "those public interests are substantially outweighed when
measured against the public interests in relation to loyalty and confidential-
ity both generally and with particular reference to AIDS patients' hospital
records. ' ' 53  The public, said the judge, will suffer no real deprivation of
knowledge here.
[A]Ithough the evidence before me shows that a wide-ranging pub-
lic debate about AIDS generally and about its effect on doctors is
,taking place among doctors of widely differing views, within and
without the BMA, in medical journals and in many newspapers
54
In his judgment, Justice Rose was clearly influenced by the 1974 Health
Service (Venereal Diseases) Regulations, made under the provisions of the
National Health Service Act of 1946. Those regulations mandate health au-
thorities "to take all necessary steps to secure that any information capable
of identifying patients ... examined or treated for any AIDS shall not be
disclosed.., except for the purpose of treatment or prevention," 55 and pri-
marily only to a doctor engaged in such professional activities. The judge
said that the Regulations obliged health authorities to preserve patient confi-
dentiality by "taking all necessary steps."
Lord Morison came to a similar conclusion as to the proper balance in his
decision in AB v. Glasgow.56 AB sought the identity of a donor whose blood
he contended was HIV-infected; he had been given that blood by transfusion
in 1986. The applicant wanted to sue the donor for damages in negligence.
The Court held that disclosure would be against the public interest in that
"any infringement of donor anonymity would put [the supply of donor
50. X. v. Y., 2 All E.R. 648 (1988). See also Donald G. Casswell, Disclosure by a Physi-
cian of Aids-Related Patient Information: An Ethical and Legal Dilemma, 68 CAN. B. REV.
225 (1989).
51. Id. at 661.
52. Id.
53. Id. The reference to loyalty points to how the newspaper got the information; a hospi-
tal employee gave it copies of the medical records.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 656.
56. See generally Unreported Scottish Court of Sessions decision, December 21, 1989.
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blood] at risk."57 That interest outweighed the public interest that in the
pursuit of justice according to law all relevant information must be
disclosed.
The announcement by the legislature, or by an entity to which the legisla-
ture delegates its power to make law, of a policy for the strict, even absolute
preservation of medical secrets is a clear signal to courts in the business of
balancing competing public interests. In the midst of the sometimes vocifer-
ous and occasionally hysterical pronouncements and counterpronounce-
ments about AIDS and its impact, a number of Australian health statutes or
regulations providing for testing, record-keeping and treatment of HIV-in-
fected persons emphatically and in fact sternly emphasise the nearly absolute
preservation of patient confidentiality. In Victoria, for example, the Health
Services Act of 198858 states that a health employee must not reveal, without
express statutory authority, any information identifying a patient, except to
the extent necessary for her or his treatment. The Health (General Amend-
ment) Act 1988 deals specifically with AIDS; it imposes a duty on those
persons who, in the course of providing a health service, become aware that
a person is or has been tested for HIV, or is infected with HIV, to take all
reasonable steps to develop and implement systems to protect the privacy of
that person.5 9 In X. v. Y, Justice Rose justified the enactment of this kind of
legislation.
Confidentiality is of paramount importance to such patients, in-
cluding doctors . . . . If it is breached or if the patients have
grounds for believing that it may be or has been breached they will
be reluctant to come forward for and to continue with treatment
and, in particular, counselling. If the actual or apprehended
breach is to the press that reluctance is likely to be very great. If
treatment is not provided or continued the individual will be de-
prived of its benefit and the public are likely to suffer from an in-
crease in the rate of spread of the disease. The preservation of
confidentiality is therefore in the public interest.'
These very recent cases give, or appear to give, some guidance on when a
doctor may reveal a patient's secrets. When, if ever, must the doctor reveal
them?
V
One answer to that question is when the law clearly orders the doctor to
57. 1 CENTRE OF MED. L. & ETHICS DISPATCH 5 (Autumn 1990).
58. VIcT. HEALTH SERVICES ACT § 141 (1988).
59. Id. 131.
60. X. v. Y., 2 All E.R. 648, 656 (1988).
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disclose. The common law knows no patient privilege; it is the creature of
statute in some common law jurisdictions, including three in Australia: Vic-
toria,61 Tasmania 62 and Northern Australia. 63 There it only avails in most
civil litigation. Otherwise in the witness box the doctor must answer, if the
question is relevant and otherwise admissible. A particular statutory provi-
sion, prescribing, say, the notification to an authority of certain conditions,
such as infectious diseases other than those linked to sexual behavior, or
certain injuries, such as gunshot wounds, may impose a clear obligation to
inform. In that kind of case, the recipient of the revealed secret will be very
specific - a health department or, perhaps, the police." The legislature
has, presumably, there done the business of balancing competing interests;
medical confidentiality has been outweighed by the public interest in the ad-
ministration of justice, or the community's general health, or the prevention
of serious crime. But are there other circumstances where the law imposes a
duty to reveal a patient's secret?
Courts in the United States, in the federal and in several state jurisdic-
tions, have held there are. The leading case Tarasoff v. Regents of University
of California,65 a decision of the Supreme Court of California in 1976, has
some very slight resemblances to some of the facts which the State Coroner
of Victoria discovered in the Vitkovic inquest.
On 27th October 1969, a 26-year-old graduate student at the University of
California at Berkeley stabbed a young woman to death, on the porch of her
parents' home. Two months earlier, the student had told his therapist, a
University health service psychologist, that he intended to kill a girl.
Enough was said to identify the victim. The psychologist was so concerned
by these threats that he initiated procedures to have the student committed
for psychiatric evaluation. Those procedures were halted by the chief of the
department of psychiatry, and the student was released from campus police
custody. He terminated his therapy. Neither the psychologist nor the cam-
pus police told, or tried to warn, the victim or her family of those threats.
After her death, her parents instituted a wrongful death action against the
psychologist and his employer, the University.
A majority of the Supreme Court of California held that both were liable.
61. VICT. EVIDENCE ACT § 28(2) (1958).
62. TAS. EVIDENCE ACT § 96(2) (1910). A new exception was added to medical privilege
in 1988 in relation to where the sanity of patient was in question - see TAS. EVIDENCE
AMENDMENT ACT § 4 (1988).
63. N.T. EVIDENCE ACT § 12(2).
64. See M. Neave, AIDS - Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn, 9 U. TAS. L. REV. 1
(1988).
65. 551 P 2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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Justice Tobriner,speaking for the court, declared that when a psychothera-
pist actually determines, or even when such a determination should be made
as a matter of professional judgment, that a patient presents a serious danger
of violence to others, the therapist is under a duty to use reasonable care to
protect the foreseeable victim from such danger.66 The source of that duty
was the special relationship between the therapist and the patient. The duty
could be discharged by a clear warning to the intended victim, or by notify-
ing the police, or by confining or controlling the patient, as the case might
be.
In extended argument before the Supreme Court, which responded to
strong criticism of its original decision by granting a re-hearing in which the
American Psychiatric Association filed an amicus curiae brief, it heard con-
tentions based on the public interest in the protection of the confidences of
patient to doctor or patient to therapist, and especially to psychiatrist or to
psychologist. Threats, the APA argued,67 were not uncommonly voiced in
therapeutic sessions; complete candor was at the heart of the therapeutic
relationship. Predictions of dangerous behavior, even if foreshadowed as
threats, could not be made on a sure and regular basis. All these arguments
were rejected. Justice Tobriner stated:
Our current crowded and computerized society compels the inter-
dependence of its members. In this risk-infected society we can
hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result
from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was
lethal. If the exercise of reasonable care to protect the threatened
victim requires the therapist to warn the endangered party or those
who can reasonably be expected to notify him, we see no sufficient
societal interest that would protect and justify concealment. The
containment of such risks lies in the public interest.68
That decision, has been followed by, and followed in, a number of similar
cases. The Supreme Court of California limited the duty to warn to a known
or readily identifiable victim, like Tatiana Tarasoff.69 In a 1980 case, a juve-
nile offender, with a record of sexual assaults on and an identified propensity
to attack children, was released into his mother's custody. He murdered a
neighbor's child. There was no duty to warn, said the Californian Court,
where the victim "was a member of a large amorphous group of potential
targets."7 ° Other American courts, however, have expanded the boundaries
66. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P 2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
67. Id. at 344.
68. Id. at 347-8.
69. Id. at 345.
70. Thompson v. County of Almeda, 614 P 2d 728, 734 (Cal 1980).
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of the duty.
The United States District Court for Nebraska held that a psychotherapist
had a duty to warn and protect unknown victims, as well as those identified
or identifiable - presumably through confining the patient.7 ' A psychiatrist
discharged a drug patient, with a dreadful history of substance abuse, who
then injured the plaintiff in a car accident whilst under the influence of nar-
cotics. The Supreme Court of Washington held the driver's psychiatrist, and
the State hospital that employed him, liable for failing to continue to confine
their patient.72 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has held that a psychotherapist owes a duty to warn, and protect, a victim of
a patient diagnosed as "potentially dangerous," though no threats to that
victim had been uttered."3 The Supreme Court of Vermont recently held
that a mental health professional has a duty to protect a third person from
the infliction of physical harm threatened by a patient-and that included
damage to property as well as to the person.74 The parents of a man who
burnt down the barn on the family farm, as he threatened to do in an inter-
view with his psychotherapist, recovered damages.
These pieces of judicial law-making have, not surprisingly, been deployed
in discussions in the United States, and in other common law countries,
about duties to warn spouses and, at least, known partners and associates of
AIDS victims, or even those people testing positively for HIV infection.
Rock Hudson's former sexual partner sued two physicians who had treated
Hudson, alleging that they conspired to prevent him from learning of Hud-
son's disease and his condition. In February 1989, a Los Angeles jury
awarded Marc Christian $21 million dollars for the "emotional distress" he
had suffered as a result of the non-disclosure.75 The trial judge, concluding
that the jury had allowed their "passion" against Hudson to color their
thinking, reduced the amount of damages to $5.5 million dollars.76
That is but one much-publicized case. The Tarasoff decision, and the later
cases, build on much earlier American decisions that held that a doctor was
under a legal duty to warn a patient's family of an infectious or contagious
disease. Waiting in the forensic wings are cases which say, an AIDS patient
has, after counselling by the doctor, agreed to tell her or his spouse or part-
71. Lipari v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
72. Petersen v. Washington, 671 P2d 230 (Wash. 1983).
73. Jablonski v. US., 712 F 2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983).
74. Peck v. Counselling Serv., 499 A 2d 422, 427-28 (Vt. 1985).
75. Rock Hudson's Lover Wins Suite, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,1989, at 22; Hudson's Lover
Wins $7 million More, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 18, 1989, at 7; AIDS Award May Be Trimmed, N.Y.
TIMES Apr. 8, 1989, at 9.
76.' AIDS Award May be Trimmed, N.Y. TIMEs Apr. 8, 1989, at 9.
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ner of the condition-but has not done so. What is the doctor's legal situa-
tion then?
There have been no cases such as these litigated in Australian, or in Eng-
lish, or Scottish courts-yet. There are no barriers to the institution of such
sorts of litigation. More than 30 years ago, Sir Harold Barrowclough, Chief
Justice of New Zealand, decided that a doctor owed a duty of care to his
patient to avoid causing her physical harm through his negligence." What
is the novelty, indeed the relevance, of that? It is that the case turned on a
patient's secrets and their disclosure by her doctor, who treated both her and
her husband. She thought her husband was becoming insane and intended
to poison her. He was not, but her statements that she believed he wanted
her dead disrupted the marriage. The husband implored their doctor to give
him a certificate about his wife's mental state, which could be given to his
solicitors. Finally the doctor did: It ended with his opinion that "she exhib-
ited symptoms of paranoia and should be given treatment for same if possi-
ble.""8 This certificate was subsequent produced by counsel for the husband
when he cross-examined the wife in separation proceedings. The wife suf-
fered nervous shock, and sued her doctor. The Chief Justice held that the
doctor owed the wife a duty not to disclose confidential information about
her in any circumstances, when he could have foreseen it would cause her
physical, including mental, harm or damage.
The possibilities for developing this legal conclusion particularly by argu-
ments based on analogy, are considerable. Its authority is slight, but it has
not been challenged since the case was decided in 1958, and it is constantly
cited in modern cases and scholarly writing on the subject of medical
confidences.
The common law in England and Australia recognizes already that in
some situations a person may be bound to control the actions of other
human beings, to avoid harm to others at their hands, or to warn those rea-
sonably foreseeable as at risk. In 1970, for instance, the House of Lords held
the Home Office was liable to the Dorset Yacht Company for the failure of
prison officers to prevent the escape of seven Borstal boys, who in fleeing
boarded an expensive vessel in Poole Harbour and badly damaged it.
79
Courts in Scotland have imposed liability on owners of buildings for destruc-
tion caused by vandals whom they, in breach of their duty, failed to keep
out.80 Courts in England, and in Australia, have imposed liability on par-
77. Furniss v. Fitchett, [1958] N.Z.L.R. 396 (1958).
78. Id. at 397.
79. Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., Ltd, 2 All E.R. 294 (1970).
80. Evans v. Glasgow, S.L.T. 8 (1987); Pask v. Oweli, 12 Qd. R. 421 (1987); Newton v.
Edgerley, 3 All E.R. 337 (1959).
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ents,8 ' and on schools82 and education authorities, a when children or stu-
dents have harmed others, even strangers, in various circumstances. True,
in all those cases there were established powers of control invested in the
luckless parents, teachers or gaolers. But there are clearly forensic opportu-
nities. Developments in the rich litigious pastures of the United States stim-
ulate and sometimes strongly encourage the institution of proceedings in
other jurisdictions. The much publicized Agent Orange defoliant suits are
one instance.84
There is an older and more famous basis for these comments. In his cele-
brated speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson, doubtless the best known civil case
decided in our century, and one which gave unique impetus to the develop-
ment of tortious liability for causing negligent injury, Lord Atkin ended with
this:
It is always a satisfaction to an English lawyer to be able to test his
application of fundamental principles of the common law by the
development of the same doctrines by the lawyers of the Courts of
the United States. In that country I find that the law appears to be
well established in the sense in which I have indicated. The mouse
had emerged from the ginger-beer bottle in the United States
before it appeared in Scotland, but there it brought a liability upon
the manufacturers. s5
The imposition of a duty to warn of known or clearly foreseeable dangers
from a patient may be developed, in modest stages or even in broad terms, if
the accidents or incidents of litigation in Australia, or in England, or in Scot-
land, present courts with that issue.
VI
In the relationship of doctor and patient, it is today the general rule that
secrets will be kept inviolate. Courts today recognize and apply that rule.
Legislatures and subordinate law making agencies embrace and embroider
81. Evans, SLT at 17.
82. Ramsay v. Larsen, 111 C.L.R. 16 (1964) (Austl.).
83. Hasaganic v. Minister of Education, 5 S.A.S.R. 554 (C.A. 1973); Carmarthenshire
County Council v. Lewis, A.C. 549 (1955).
84. Australian and New Zealand veterans from the Vietnam War [1961-72] joined, using
the mechanism of a class action, with United States veterans in a suit which the latter had
already begun against the Dow Chemical Coy. and others. There was an enormous amount of
litigation, see re Agent Orange Product Liability, 597 F. Supp 740, 876-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
for a list of the large number and variety of actions involved in this matter up to approximately
1984. Australian and New Zealand veterans eventually were awarded a proportional share of
the total settlement figure, In re Agent Orange Product Liability, 611 F. Supp 1396, 1444
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F. 2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
85. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 598 (1932).
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it, especially in some of the particular enactments produced in response to
the threats seen as presented by AIDS and AIDS-related conditions. In
Australia, the enactment of general privacy legislation 6 by the federal Par-
liament, which it is likely at least some of the state legislatures will copy,
strongly buttresses that rule. Yet we see that it is not absolute. Are its limits
now clearly defined? Have doctors, and their patients, received precise in-
structions that set out the situations where confidences may, or must, be
breached? I think not. This is an unsatisfactory, and unsafe, situation. The
safety of the community from an apprehended attack, such as occurred in
Queen Street, Melbourne, or the preservation of any single person's life or
bodily welfare, clearly justify the revelation of a medical secret. But circum-
stances are all important. Judgments of "when" and "how" and "to whom"
are critical. The values of life, and of bodily integrity, have been given great
weight in judicial balancing processes-after the event. Doctors need to
know in advance, when they may, or must, reveal a patient's secret.
One reaction to what may be seen as the absence of any complete guidance
on the limits of medical confidentiality is to propose specific legislation to
meet an identified need. In his report on the Queen Street massacre, the
State Coroner of Victoria said that he was concerned that in December 1986,
Vitkovic was considered by a psychologist to be in need of psychiatric assist-
ance, but, by reason of the psychologist's professional and ethical considera-
tions, did not receive help.87 He recommended 8 that consideration be given
to the framing of regulations under the terms of the then recently revised
and reenacted Psychologists Registration Act of 1987. These would require,
the Coroner proposed, any psychologist administering or interpreting cer-
tain psychological tests to which the statute adverts, who formed the opinion
that a patient or client "is likely to be a danger to himself or herself or
others"89 to take all reasonable measures to make that person attend for or
submit to psychiatric examination and treatment. The bulk of the Act re-
mains unproclaimed, and no Regulations have been yet prepared. By con-
trast, there was a swift, almost immediate, response, even before the State
Coroner's enquiry was ended, to an identified lacuna in Victoria's firearms
legislation9° and its administration that allowed Vitkovic in late 1987 to buy
a semi-automatic rifle. Before 1987 ended the Firearms Regulations were
amended. 9 Were the Coroner's recommendations to be adopted there
86. AUSTL. PRIVACY AcT § 119 (1988).
87. See State Coroner's Report, supra note 1, at 2.
88. Id. at 24.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 26.
91. VICT. FIREARMS REGULATIONS S.R. 374 (1987).
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would be no precise guidance to any health professionals except registered
psychologists. Neither doctors in general practice nor psychiatrists would be
affected.
There are directions to doctors and health professionals in some of the
specific enactments which various legislatures, in Australia92 and in the
United States,93 have passed to respond to the now universal spread of AIDS
and AIDS-related conditions. These range from unequivocal prohibitions
on the disclosure of any identifying information, 9' even in the course of com-
plying with mandatory provisions for the notification of AIDS and AIDS-
related conditions, which I have already mentioned, to several American
measures95 permitting disclosure of the condition by a doctor to a patient's
spouse if the doctor reasonably believes that the patient will not voluntarily
reveal it. There is, as might be expected, a cornucopia of models provided by
some of the fifty-one legislatures in the United States. In the AIDS context,
there are continuing, ever sharper tensions where disclosure to other health
professionals providing care may be justified under current legislative provi-
sions, but not to a spouse-even a wife anticipating a pregnancy. Notwith-
standing these instances, the very precision and clarity of some of such
particular statutes serve to accentuate what is lacking in those cases where
AIDS or HIV infection does not figure in the doctor-patient relationship.
The very recent cases96 postulate that a balancing process must be under-
taken to determine whether a medical secret may be revealed. In the nature
of the making of law by judges, confined as Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. said, "from molar to molecular motions," they do offer guidance
in England, until the House of Lords speaks, in those cases where it is highly
likely, or probable, that the patient may kill or cause serious physical injury
to others because there is evidence that she or he has already done that.
They are persuasive in other parts of the common law world, to that same
degree. Doctors and other health professionals are entitled to claim more
direction, especially since decisions may need to be made very quickly, and
92. N.S.W. PUBLIC HEALTH ACT § § 50G & 50H(l) (1991); S. AUSTL. PUBLIC & ENVI-
RONMENTAL HEALTH ACT § 30 (1987)
93. The following United States statutes require physicians, hospitals, and laboratories to
report AIDS diagnoses to public health authorities: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-135 (1992);
OR. REV. STAT. § 433.004 (1991); TEX. REV. STAT. art. 4419b-1, repealed Acts 1989, 71st
leg., Ch. 678 § 131(1); COLORADO REV. STAT. §§ 25-4-1401 to 25-4-1410 (Supp. 1992).
94. VICT. HEALTH SERVICES ACT § 141 (1988); VICT. HEALTH ACT § 128 (1958).
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.25 (West 1990).
96. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P 2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) (psychother-
apist's duty to reveal medical secret limited to a known or readily identifiable victim); cf
Lipari v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp 185, 193 9D. Neb. 1980) (physician's duty broad-
ened to cover anyone whom the doctor could reasonably foresee as at risk from the patient).
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without even that comforting consultation with senior colleagues, or refer-
ence to a medical detence society or professional association, as suggested in
the rules of the GMC, which received such favorable scrutiny in W. v
Egdell.97 Once the decision is made to reveal the secret, the situation
changes forever. It can never be recovered, as may be possible in other
breach of confidence situations involving commercial or trade secrets, or
even government secrets, where proliferation and publication to a wide audi-
ence are the real concerns. The job may be lost, the marriage sundered, the
body broken, the years added to a prison sentence. Or a less formal but
nonetheless precious relationship may be irreparably affected. "Until you
speak, the words are your prisoners," runs a Yiddish proverb. "Once you
speak," it goes on, "you are theirs."
The judges and the courts whose decisions I have considered, have under-
standably accorded weight and paid close attention to the statements made
by professional bodies in the field of medicine. Given the disciplinary role
and powers of the General Medical Council, its advice to the British medical
profession is of great force and effect, as was emphasized in Dr. Egdell's
case. Its Rules state that
Rarely, disclosure may be justified on the ground that it is in the
public interest which, in certain circumstances such as, for exam-
ple, investigation by the police of a grave or very serious crime,
would override the doctor's duty to maintain his patient's
confidence.
98
That sole example points those who read the text to past conduct and its
consequences. The 1984 version of the Code of Ethics of the Australian
Medical Association states:
It is the practitioner's obligation to observe strictly the rule of pro-
fessional secrecy by refraining from disclosing voluntarily without
the consent of the patient (save by statutory sanction) to any third
party information which he has learnt in his professional relation-
ship with the patient.
The complications of modern life sometimes create difficulties for
the doctor in the application of the principle, and on certain occa-
sions it may be necessary to acquiesce in some modification. Al-
ways, however, the overriding consideration must be the adoption
of a line of conduct that will benefit the patient or protect his
interests.
The principle of professional secrecy still applies as between hus-
band and wife but there are times when consent if not actually
97. 1 Ch. 359, 390 (1990).
98. Id. at 390.
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given by a spouse could be reasonably inferred. The decision
whether to divulge the information to the other spouse, when con-
sent has not been obtained, would be a matter for the discretion of
the attending practitioner which he must exercise with the greatest
care and for which he must accept full responsibility at all times.
He must adopt a line of conduct that will benefit the patient and
protect the patient's interest. Moreover, if he does anything which
damages the patient's interest he renders himself liable to an action
at law.99
This language, which does not have the status of the Rules in the Blue
Book but to which many Australian doctors will refer, could attract the
acerbic comment which Australia's great Chief Justice, Sir Owen Dixon, en-
joyed uttering in other contexts:
It was an American girl who said of the Ten Commandments that
they confuse your mind and do not tell you what you ought to
do. 100
In June 1990, the Scottish Home and Health Department published a
Code of Practice on Confidentiality of Personal Health Information. Its sta-
tus is that it is part of the duty statement affecting all employees of the Scot-
tish Health service, and it is incorporated into agreements with independent
contractors. The Code states that it also applies to "students and trainees
... to local authority social workers who operate within the Health Service,
and to voluntary workers and to any person who is granted access to per-
sonal health information." 10 1 "Personal health information" is defined, or
described, in very broad terms; it includes information supplied to the SHS
"by local authority education and social work departments and other statu-
tory and voluntary organizations. ' 102 It applies "to information on per-
sonal, family or social circumstances which is relevant to an individual's
health or treatment and becomes part of the personal health
information."'l 3
The central element in the Code is that personal health information is
confidential. It should only be disclosed in connection with "health care and
social welfare" to those SHS personnel who "need to know" so that "effec-
tive treatment and care" may be provided. It may not be disclosed without
99. CODE OF ETHICS OF AuST. MED. ASS'N.
100. See 31 A.L.J. 341 (1957); K. 0. Shatwell, Some Reflections on the Problems of Law
Reform, 31 A.L.J. 325 (1957).
101. SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT. CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONAL
HEALTH INFORMATION CODE OF PRACTICE cl. 4 (June 1990) [hereinafter ScoIrIsH HOME &
HEALTH].
102. Id. cl. 5.
103. Id.
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the patient's consent, which may be implied in a variety of circumstances,
unless "disclosure is required by statute or is ordered by a court of law or by
a body or person empowered by statute to require such a disclosure."'"
The Code announces that patients should be informed of these matters, in-
cluding the purposes of proper disclosures, the recipients of any disclosed
information, and the safeguards to be applied, through information leaflets
or the inclusion of a suitable section in a hospital patients' handbook.
The publication of the Code attracted what the Nursing Times called "a
howl of protest from Scottish GPs."' 5 The focus of that was the section of
"Disclosure by Implied Consent", which the BMA's Scottish General Serv-
ices Committee thought was so widely cast that it would lead patients to a
reluctance to give their doctors sensitive information, for fear it would be
disseminated widely inside and outside the health system. Official efforts to
allay those fears have been made. The AMA has asked for the Code to be
withdrawn.
The SHS Code contains one section 10 6 entitled "Disclosures Without
Consent." It has not been the focus of the BMA's or Royal College of Nurs-
ing's Scottish Board's criticisms. These disclosures, the Code states, are "a
last resort."' 0 7 "Every reasonable effort should be made to obtain the pa-
tient's consent."' 1 8 But there are three areas where, when that consent can-
not be obtained or is adamantly refused, there is a discretion-the Code's
term-to disclose personal health information. These are:
Where disclosure is in the wider public interest0 gSuch circum-
stances require the wider public interest to outweigh the rights of a
patient to confidentiality. This might include cases where disclo-
sure would prevent a serious risk to public health, or assist in the
prevention, detection or prosecution of serious crime. In some
cases the duty to disclose details may lie with the patient.
Where disclosure is necessary to prevent serious injury or damage
to the health of a third party' 1o
In such instances, it will be necessary to assess the risk and the
seriousness of the potential injury or damage to the third party
against the rights of the patient to confidentiality.
Where disclosure is in the best interest of the patient"'
104. Id. cl. 6, 3.
105. H. Gaze, Open Secrets?, 86 NURSING TIMES 19 (1990).
106. SCOTTISH HOME & HEALTH, supra note 101, at cl. 8-10.
107. Id. cl. 8.
108. Id.
109. Id., cl. 9.1.
110. Id. cl. 9.2.
Ill. Id. cl. 9.3.
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In exceptional circumstances the interests of the patient may out-
weigh the need for confidentiality even where there has been ex-
plicit refusal to give consent, but this should only be done after the
most careful consideration.
The enunciation of these conditions is in more extensive terms, and at
least apparently more precise, than what appears in the GMC's Rules or the
AMA's ethical statement. The last of the three areas is laden with ambigui-
ties and offers the possibilities of paternalistic interventions and revelations,
particularly as affecting information to a patient's spouse or another family
member. Information, it will be recalled, may be disclosed for the purposes
of both health care provision and social welfare. The first two areas, how-
ever, spell out more clearly the limits of medical confidentiality for Scot-
land-at least as far as the widespread operations of the Scottish Health
Service are concerned. The GMC's Rule 81(g), and the import of W. v.
Egdel1112 and R. v. Crozier,"3 which focus on dangerous propensities
evinced by past acts, may be contrasted with the Code's language. The sec-
ond area encompasses situations such as those in the tragic Tarasoff case,"'14
but not, perhaps, those threat situations where no specific third party is iden-
tified as the target. The Code concludes that section with a sober warning:
Disclosure without consent always raises extremely difficult ques-
tions involving moral, ethical and medical issues and such cases
must be considered with great care." 5
This section of the Code deserves more praise than criticism. Its overall
emphasis is right. It does seek not only to signal to doctors and health
professionals that there are instances where secrets may be revealed but also
to advise them of the serious matters that must be examined and considered
and the competing considerations that may need to be weighed. The Code's
instructions on the importance of providing comprehensive patient informa-
tion on these matters are particularly commendable.
There is a model which may, with appropriate diffidence, be offered as
worth consideration in terms of improving further the Code of Practice.
Earlier I mentioned the guidelines for the Protection of Privacy in Medical
Research made by the NH & MRC of Australia, under the terms of the
novel Privacy Act of 1988. In its Report on Informed Decisions about Med-
ical Procedures, published in 1989, the Law Reform Commission of Victo-
ria, in conjunction with the Australian and New South Wales Law Reform
112. 1 Ch. 359 (C.A. 1990).
113. 12 Cr. App. R. 206 (Crim. App. 1990).
114. 551 P 2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
115. ScoTriSH HOME & HEALTH DEPARTMENT, supra note 101, at cl. 10.
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Commissions, recommended' 16 that detailed guidelines on the provision by
doctors to patients of information concerning medical treatment and proce-
dures be prepared. The nature and contents of the guidelines will encompass
both general requirements and extensive illustrations "by reference to spe-
cific procedures." Checklists of matters on which information should be
given, covering choices and risks, may be included. Detailed examples set-
ting out appropriate information may be produced. In relation to medical
confidentiality and its limits, the adoption of this approach could result in
the expansion of the SHS Code's section on "Disclosure Without Consent",
say, to encompass accounts of actual and hypothetical situations which have
presented themselves, or which may arise, with decisions clearly set out on
whether the doctor should speak, or keep quiet. Even specific scripts for use
in attempting to obtain the patient's consent, as a necessary preliminary to
disclosure in some instances, or to explain to a patient why a secret would be
revealed, in others, could be incorporated in such guidelines.
The Australian Report on Informed Decision Making recommends that
the guidelines receive recognition in appropriate legal contexts, either in ac-
tions where a patient seeks damages from a doctor," 7 or in disciplinary pro-
ceedings for professional misconduct."1 8 Similar steps could be taken in
relation to guidelines, or to an expanded Code of Practice, on medical confi-
dentiality. The Report goes on to recommend that the guidelines be pre-
pared under the auspices of the NH & MRC, so that they will be Australia-
wide in operation, and will draw both on medical expertise and medical con-
sumer contributions (in line with the normal practice of the Health Care
Committee of the NH & MRC to include wide representation from the com-
munity on all its preparation subcommittees.) The Report recommends 1 9
that the guidelines be disseminated widely, especially in undergraduate and
post-graduate education programmes for doctors and health caregivers; by
major teaching hospitals and private hospitals developing protocols for giv-
ing information to patients; by health complaints and medical disciplinary
bodies reporting regularly on doctor/patient communication issues brought
before on them; and by general patient education. All of these measures
could be adopted in relation to an expanded Code of Practice or guidelines,
on medical confidentiality.
116. VICTORIA LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Informed Decisions About Medical Procedures
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VII
The preparation, the promulgation, and the wide dissemination of guide-
lines or of a comprehensive, expanded Code of Practice, with its proper set-
ting in the texture of the law relating to the restraint of disclosures, or of
compensation for breach of confidence, and professional discipline, will be of
value for doctors, for health professionals, and for their patients and their
clients. It should be made clear that as a matter of law a justified disclosure
will carry protection from both disciplinary actions, and from suits for com-
pensation for revealing medical secrets. That should also ensure that any
litigation arising out of alleged failures to warn will not be instituted with
any chance of success where the guidelines, or the Code, have been followed.
But it will not, because it cannot, remove always and everywhere a doc-
tor's need to decide, often alone, often swiftly what the Scottish Code of
Practice describes as some "extremely difficult questions involving moral,
ethical and medical issues .... 12o That task, however may be made less
difficult than it is today. Doctors, and their patients, and that means us all,
are entitled to expect that it should be.
120. ScorrISH HOME & HEALTH DEPARTMENT, supra note 101, at cl. 10.
